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David B. Rothnan* and Roy A. Schotland**
Edward Ryan, a delegate to the 1846 Wisconsin constitutional
convention who later became a chief justice of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, saw the issue clearly. He stated that the judiciary "rep-
resents no man, no majority, no people. It represents the written law
of the land ... it holds the balance, and weighs the right between
man and man, between the rich and the poor, between the weak and
the powerful.'
Any consideration of judicial elections begins with one over-
riding fact: these elections are uniquely different from all other
elections. But to appreciate the uniqueness of judicial elections, we
must first note the differences between judges and other elective of-
ficials.
t This paper was prepared specifically for the Summit on Improving Ju-
dicial Selection. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the National Center for State
Courts, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute.
* Associate Director of Research, National Center for State Courts.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Edward G. Ryan, Elective Judiciary, Address at the Wisconsin Consti-
tutional Convention (Nov. 30, 1846), in 2 THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 590,
594 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1919) (contained in Collections, Vol. 27). Ryan also
stated:
Let the judiciary stand on the eternal rock of right, unswayed by all
the clamorous waves of opinion chafing [at] its unconscious base-
above all influences, above all representation-the representative of
eternal and living truth.
Then, sir, it is an idle fiction, a baseless plausibility to say that the
principles of our representative government require the election of our
judiciary by the people.
Id. at 595. We are indebted to Chief Justice Shirley Abrahmson for this refer-
ence.
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Executive and legislative officials are elected in all democracies,
but the United States is all but unique in having judges stand for
election. Consider the role of the judge:
The ideal judge has integrity. He or she not only appears
to be, but actually is scrupulously honest, impartial, free of
prejudice, and able to decide cases on their merits without
regard to the identity of the parties or their attorneys, his or
her own interests, or the likely criticism. The ideal judge is
committed to the rule of law-he or she will respect the
authority of higher courts, follow existing precedent, and
adhere to accepted procedures for interpreting statutes and
deciding issues. Finally, the ideal judge is humane. He or
she invariably treats all who appear before the court with
dignity and courtesy, is sensitive to the special vulnerabili-
ties of victims, children, and disadvantaged groups, and is
patient, recognizing that people who resort to the courts
have very different backgrounds and abilities. Humaneness
is an especially important quality for trial judges, who have
the most frequent contact with the public. Of course the
ideal judge is impossible to find; judges are, after all, hu-
man beings. A good judge, however, deviates from the
ideal infrequently and only in minor ways.
An elective official who must act "without regard to the identity
of the parties or their attorneys, his or her own interests, or likely
criticism" is obviously a very special kind of elective official.3 A
second key difference between judges and other elective officials is
that the judge's actions directly impact identifiable parties, usually
only very few persons. Individuals contesting in the political process
depend on almost always being part of large groups of like-minded
people, and also on vigorous electoral accountability. But plaintiffs
and defendants are usually alone or all but alone before a judge-
they depend mainly on the judge's impartiality and independence.
That only increases the need for taking all the steps we can to protect
that crucial impartiality.
2. SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL




The tension between the judges' fundamental obligations, and
the necessity to campaign for election or reelection, is undeniable.
The tension turns even more acute as the judge grapples with the fact
that the necessity for a campaign means a necessity to raise funds.
One way to reduce these tensions is by having merit selection and
retention-only elections. However, the search for remedies cannot
stop with stating a preference for that solution. Steps are needed to
reduce the problems that come with judicial elections, even in some
measure, with retention-only elections.
I. THE SIX MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JuDICIAL ANM OTHER
ELECTIONS.
The six major differences between judicial elections and other
elections, which render them what may be called "quasi-elections,"
are:
1) Restraints on Campaign Conduct
Whatever the type of judicial election, judicial candidates are
uniquely restricted in what they can say in a campaign.
2) Special Types of Elections
Retention-only and nonpartisan contests are obviously funda-
mentally different from ordinary elections. These special types of
elections are again, obviously chosen because of the differences be-
tween the judiciary and other branches. Although the jurisdiction
chooses to have electoral accountability for its judges, it seeks to bal-
ance that accountability with protection for judicial independence.
3) The Ballot
Ballot length and placement are major shapers of voter partici-
pation in judicial elections. In March 1998, voters in Cook County,
Illinois faced primary election ballots that included 178 candidates
running for twenty-five vacancies on the appellate and circuit courts.
In Harris County (Houston), Texas, and Cuyahoga County (Cleve-
land), Ohio, ballots have traditionally included candidates for as
many as fifty or more judicial offices. In all these long-ballot situa-
tions, the judicial candidates come at or near the end of the ballot,
with the obvious result that fewer votes may be cast for them.
4) Voter Awareness and Participation
Starting as long as forty-five years ago, exit polls and other polls
have shown a startling lack of voter awareness of even the names of
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the candidates. However, giving voters sufficient information to cast
informed votes is costly-and in judicial elections, if that cost is to
be met, it is by the candidates' raising funds.
5) The Special Role of Attorneys
While many elective offices have special relationships to par-
ticular groups-such as the school boards' relationship to parents and
teachers-lawyers and judges have unusual links. Some lawyers are
frequently in court, repeatedly before the same judges; and many
lawyers, and most firms, will often be in court. Most judges will
have former law partners who continue in active practice. And all
judges who campaign will turn to lawyers for support, sometimes fi-
nancial, but often simple endorsement. Even without any formal role
in a judicial campaign, lawyers are a leading source of information
on judicial candidates. Many judicial campaigns are primarily
funded by lawyers' contributions, although that is not a prevailing
pattern according to the data we have been able to assemble.
The special role of judicial campaigns and attorneys in those
campaigns is, of course, reflected in the status and responsibility of
the American Bar Association, with respect to both the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.
6) The Special Role of Name Familiarity
Whatever one's view of the value of famous names in politics, in
judicial elections, name familiarity is more important than ever.4
When we turn to aspects of judicial campaigns, such as lawyers'
contributions to the candidates and the candidates' fund-raising gen-
erally, the differences noted above show we must keep in mind how
great the difficulty facing judicial candidates is in aiding voters to
cast meaningful votes.
II. CHANGES IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
"In the past, judicial elections were low-key affairs, conducted
with civility and dignity. As a result, they were relatively inexpen-
sive. However, that is no longer the case. Today, in many
4. In a sense, this is not a separate, sixth difference from other kinds of
elections, but rather a result that flows from the other differences.
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jurisdictions, judicial elections have taken on all of the trappings of
partisan politics, significantly increasing the resulting cost."
As one source noted:
In a sense, what is happening now is the latest swing of a
slow-moving pendulum. Earlier in the nation's history,
most judges were appointed by governors or mayors. But
patronage, not merit, was what got one person appointed in-
stead of another in many cases. So the trend toward elect-
ing judges was itself a reform, seen as a way of removing
politics and corruption from judicial selection.
Now, as undemocratic as it seems to say it, electing
judges is the evil that needs to be reformed. The Bill of
Rights, if put to a popular vote, might well not win the sup-
port of a majority. So the judges who are charged with
protecting those individual rights should also not have to
please the majority on Election Day.
[E]very time a state judge promises during a campaign to
sentence bad guys to death, capital defense lawyers should
challenge the judge's impartiality. Eventually, either
through litigation or public opinion, the current system has
to change.
6
5. The Honorable Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is
There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995). The changes
in judicial elections have been summed up as making them "noisier, nastier,
and costlier." Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11,
1988, at 74.
6. Tony Mauro, Judges Shouldn't Have to Please Voters, USA TODAY,
Oct. 18, 2000, at 17A.
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